Abstract. Object invariants define the consistency of objects. They have subtle semantics, mainly because of call-backs, multi-object invariants, and subclassing. Several verification techniques for object invariants have been proposed. It is difficult to compare these techniques, and to ascertain their soundness, because of their differences in restrictions on programs and invariants, in the use of advanced type systems (e.g., ownership types), in the meaning of invariants, and in proof obligations. We develop a unified framework for such techniques. We distil seven parameters that characterise a verification technique, and identify sufficient conditions on these parameters which guarantee soundness. We instantiate our framework with three verification techniques from the literature, and use it to assess soundness and compare expressiveness.
Introduction
Object invariants play a crucial role in the verification of object-oriented programs, and have been an integral part of all major contract languages such as Eiffel [25] , the Java Modeling Language JML [17] , and Spec# [2] . Object invariants express consistency criteria for objects, ranging from simple properties of single objects (for instance, that a field is non-null) to complex properties of whole object structures (for instance, the sorting of a tree).
While the basic idea of object invariants is simple, verification techniques for practical OO-programs face challenges. These challenges are made more daunting by the common expectation that classes should be verified without knowledge of their clients and subclasses:
Call-backs: Methods that are called while the invariant of an object o is temporarily broken might call back into o and find o in an inconsistent state. Multi-object invariants: When the invariant of an object p depends on the state of another object o, modifications of o potentially break the invariant of p. In particular, when verifying o, the invariant of p may not be known and (if not) cannot be expected to be preserved. Subclassing: When the invariant of a subclass D refers to fields declared in a superclass C then methods of C can break D's invariant by assigning to these fields. In particular, when verifying a class, its subclass invariants are not known in general, and so cannot be expected to be preserved. 
Example and Approach
Example. Consider a scenario, in which a Person holds an Account, and has a salary . An Account has a balance, an interestRate and an associated DebitCard. This example will be used throughout the paper, both to illustrate the concepts of our formalism and to make comparisons between existing verification techniques. We give the code for our example in Fig. 1 . Account's interestRate is required to be zero when the balance is negative (I1). A further invariant (the two can be read as conjuncts of the full invariant for the class) ensures that the DebitCard associated with an account has a consistent reference back to the account (I2). A SavingsAccount is a special kind of Account, whose balance must be positive (I3). Person's invariant (I4) requires that the sum of salary and account's balance is positive. Finally, DebitCard's invariant (I5) requires dailyCharges not to exceed the balance of the associated account. Thus, I2, I4, and I5 are multi-object invariants.
To illustrate the challenges faced by verification techniques, suppose that p is an object of class Person, which holds the Account a with DebitCard d:
Call-backs: When p executes its method spend(), this results in a call of withdraw on a, which (via a call to sendReport) eventually calls back notify on p; the call notify might reach p in a state where I4 does not currently hold. Multi-object invariants: When a executes its method withdraw, it may temporarily break its invariant I1, since its balance is debited before any corresponding change is made to its interestRate . This violation is not important according to the visible state semantics; the if statement immediately afterwards ensures that the invariant is restored before the next visible state. However, by making an unrestricted reduction of the account balance, the method potentially breaks the invariants of other objects as well. In particular, p's invariant I4, and d's invariant I5 may be broken. Subclassing: Further to the previous point, if a is a SavingsAccount, then calling the method withdraw may break the invariant I3, which was not necessarily known during the verification of class Account. These points are addressed in the literature by striking various trade-offs between the differing aspects listed in the introduction.
Approach. Our framework uses seven parameters to capture the first four aspects in which verification techniques differ. To describe these parameters we use two abstract notions, which we call regions and properties. A region is an element of our formalism which (when interpreted semantically) describes a set of objects (e.g., those on which a method may be called), while a property describes a set of invariants (e.g., the invariants that have to be proven before a method call). We deal with the aspects identified in the previous section as follows:
1. Invariant semantics: The property X describes the invariants expected to hold in visible states. The property V describes the invariants vulnerable to a given method, i.e., those which may be broken while the method executes.
Invariant restrictions:
The property D describes the invariants that may depend on a given heap location. This also characterises indirectly the locations an invariant may depend on. 3. Proof obligations: The properties B and E describe the invariants that must be proven to hold before a method call and at the end of a method body, respectively. 4. Program restrictions: The regions U and C describe the permitted receivers for field updates and method calls, respectively. 5. Type systems: We parameterise our framework by the type system. We state requirements on the type system, but leave abstract its concrete definition. We require that types are formed of a region-class pair such that we can handle types that express heap topologies (such as ownership types). 6. Specification languages: Rather than describing invariants concretely, we assume a judgement that expresses that an object satisfies the invariant of a class in a heap.
Verification logics:
We express proof obligations via a special construct prv p, which throws an exception if the invariants in property p cannot be proven, and has an empty effect otherwise. We leave abstract how the actual proofs are constructed and checked. Fig. 2 illustrates the parameters of our framework by annotating the body of the method withdraw. X may be assumed to hold in the pre-and post-state of the method. Between these visible states, some object invariants may be broken (so long as they fall within V), but X \ V is known to hold throughout the method body. Field updates and method calls are allowed if the receiver object (here, this) is in U and C, respectively. Before a method call, B must be proven. At the end of the method body, E must be proven. Finally, D (not shown in Fig. 2 ) constrains the effects of field updates on invariants. Thus, assignments to balance and interestRate affect at most D. It might seem surprising that we need as many as seven parameters. This number is justified by the variety of concepts used by modern verification techniques, such as accessibility of fields, purity, helper methods, ownership, and effect specifications. For instance, V would be redundant if all methods were to re-establish the invariants they break; in such a setting, a method could break invariants only through field updates, and V could be derived from U and D. However, in general, methods may break but not re-establish invariants.
Invariant Semantics
We formalise invariant semantics through an operational semantics, defining at which execution points invariants are expected to hold. In order to cater for the different techniques, the semantics is parameterised by properties to express proof obligations and what invariants are expected to hold. In this section, we focus on the main ideas of our semantics and relegate the less interesting definitions to App. A. We assume sets of identifiers for class names Cls, field names Fld, and method names Mthd, and use variables c ∈ Cls, f ∈ Fld and m ∈ Mthd.
Runtime Structures. A runtime structure is a tuple consisting of sets of heaps Hp, addresses Adr, and values Val = Adr ∪ {null}, using variables h ∈ Hp, ι ∈ Adr, and v ∈ Val. A runtime structure provides the following operations. dom(h) represents the domain of the heap. cls(h, ι) yields the class of the object at address ι. The operation fld(h, ι, f ) yields the value of a field f of the object at address ι. Finally, upd(h, ι, f, v) yields the new heap after a field update, and new(h, ι, t) yields the heap and address resulting from the creation of an object. We leave abstract how these operations work, but require properties about their behaviour, for instance that upd only modifies the corresponding field of the object at the given address, and leaves the remaining heap unmodified. See Def. 9 in App. A for details. A stack frame σ ∈ Stk = Adr × Adr × Mthd × Cls is a tuple of a receiver address, an argument address, a method identifier, and a class. The latter two indicate the method currently being executed and the class where it is defined.
Regions, Properties and Types. A region r ∈ R is a syntactic representation for a set of objects; a property p ∈ P is a syntactic representation for a set of assertions about particular objects. It is crucial that our syntax is parametric with the specific regions and properties; we use different regions and properties to model different verification techniques. We define a type t ∈ Typ, as a pair of a region and a class. The region allows us to cater for types that express the topology of the heap, without being specific about the underlying type system.
Expressions. In Fig. 3 , we define source expressions e ∈ Expr. In order to simplify our presentation (but without loss of generality), we restrict methods to always have exactly one argument. Besides the usual basic object-oriented constructs, we include proof annotations e prv p. As we will see later, such a proof annotation executes the expression e and then imposes a proof obligation for the invariants characterised by the property p. To maintain generality, we avoid being precise about the actual syntax and checking of proofs.
In Fig. 3 , we also define runtime expressions e r ∈ RExpr. A runtime expression is a source expression, a value, a nested call with its stack frame σ, an exception, or a decorated runtime expression. A verification exception verfExc indicates that a proof obligation failed. A fatal exception fatalExc indicates that an expected invariant does not hold. Runtime expressions can be decorated with call e r and ret e r to mark the beginning and end of a method call, respectively. In Def. 10 (App. A), we define evaluation contexts, E[·], which describe contexts within one activation record and extend these to runtime contexts, F [·], which also describe nested calls.
Programming Languages. We define a programming language as a tuple consisting of a set Prg of programs, a runtime structure, a set of regions, and a set of properties (see Def. 11 in App. A). Each Π ∈ Prg comes equipped with the following operations. The interpretation of a region produces a set of objects. We characterise each invariant by an object-class pair, with the intended meaning that the invariant specified in the class holds for the object.
2 Therefore, the interpretation of a property produces a set of object-class pairs, specifying all the invariants of interest. Regions and properties are interpreted w.r.t. a heap, and from the viewpoint of a "current object"; therefore, their definitions depend on heap and address parameters:
Each program also comes with typing judgements Γ e : t and h e r : t for source and runtime expressions, respectively. An environment Γ ∈ Env is a tuple of the class containing the current method, the method identifier, and the type of the sole argument.
Finally, the judgement h |= ι, c expresses that in heap h, the object at address ι satisfies the invariant declared in class c. We define that the judgement trivially holds if the object is not allocated (ι ∈ dom(h)) or is not an instance of c (cls(h, ι) <: c). We say that the property p is valid in heap h w.r.t. address ι if all invariants in [[p] ] h,ι are satisfied. We denote validity of properties by h |= p, ι:
Operational Semantics. The operational semantics uses the framework parameter X to describe what invariants are expected to hold at visible states. Given a program Π and a property X c,m characterising the property that needs to hold at the beginning and end of a method m of class c, the runtime semantics is the relation −→ ⊆ (RExpr × Hp) × (RExpr × Hp) defined in Fig. 4 .
The first seven rules are standard for object-oriented languages. Note that in rNew, a new object is created using the function new, which takes a type as parameter rather than a class, thereby making the semantics parametric w.r.t. the type system: different type systems may use different regions and definitions of new to describe heap-topological information. Similarly, upd and fld do not fix a particular heap representation. Rule rCall describes method calls; it stores the class in which the method body is defined, in the new stack frame σ, and introduces the "marker" call e r at the beginning of the method body. Our reduction rules abstract away from program verification and describe only its effect. Thus, rLaunch, rLaunchExc, rFrame, and rFrameExc check whether X c,m is valid at the beginning and end of any execution of a method m defined in class c, and generate a fatal exception, fatalExc, if the check fails. This represents the visible state semantics discussed in the introduction. Proof obligations e prv p are verified once e reduces to a value (rPrf and rPrfExc); if p is not found to be valid, a verification exception verfExc is generated.
Verification using visible state semantics amounts to showing all proof obligations in some program logic, based on the assumption that expected invariants hold in visible states. A specific verification technique described in our framework is therefore sound if it guarantees that a fatalExc is never encountered. Verification technique soundness does allow verfExc to be generated, but this will never happen in a correctly verified program.
This semantics allows us to be parametric w.r.t. the syntax of invariants and the logic of proofs. We also define properties that permit us to be parametric w.r.t. a sound type system (cf. Def. 15 in App. A). Thus, we can concentrate entirely on verification concerns.
Verification Techniques
A verification technique is essentially a 7-tuple, where the components of the tuple provide instantiations for the seven parameters of our framework. These instantiations are expressed in terms of the regions and properties provided by the programming language. To allow the instantiations to refer to the program (for instance, to look up field declarations), we define a verification technique as a mapping from programs to 7-tuples.
Definition 1 A verification technique V for a programming language is a mapping from programs into a tuple:
To describe a verification technique applied to a program, we write the application of the components to class, method names, etc., D c : the property that may depend on fields declared in class c. The parameter c can be used, for instance, to prevent invariants from depending on fields declared in c's superclasses [16, 27] .
B c,m,r : the property whose validity has to be proven before calling a method on a receiver in region r from the execution of a method m in class c. The parameters allow proof obligations to depend on the calling method and the ownership relation between the caller and the callee. E c,m : the property whose validity has to be proven at the end of method m in class c. The parameters allow a technique to require different proofs for different methods, e.g., to exclude subclass invariants.
U c,m,c : the region of allowed receivers for an update of a field in class c , within the body of method m in class c. The parameters allow a technique, for instance, to prevent field updates within pure methods.
C c,m,c ,m : the region of allowed receivers for a call to method m of class c , within the body of method m of class c. The parameters allow a technique to permit calls depending on attributes (e.g., purity or effect specifications) of the caller and the callee.
The class and method identifiers used as parameters to our components can be extracted from an environment Γ or a stack frame σ in the obvious way. Thus, for Γ = c, m, or for σ = (ι, , c, m), we use X Γ and X σ as shorthands for X c,m ; we also use B Γ,r and B σ,r as shorthands for B c,m,r .
(vs-null) Well-Verified Programs. The judgement Γ V e expresses that expression e is well-verified according to verification technique V . It is defined in Fig. 5 . The first five rules express that literals, variable lookup, object creation, and field read do not require proofs. The receiver of a field update must fall into U (vs-ass). The receiver of a call must fall into C (vs-call). Moreover, we require the proof of B before a call. Finally, a class is well-verified if the body of each of its methods is well-verified and ends with a proof obligation for E (vs-class). Note that we use the type judgement Γ e : t without defining it; the definition is given by the underlying programming language, not by our framework. A program Π is well-verified w.r.t. V , denoted as V Π, iff (1) all classes are well-verified and (2) all class invariants respect the dependency restrictions dictated by D. That is, the invariant of an object ι declared in a class c will be preserved by an update of a field of a class c if it is not within D c .
Valid States. The properties X and X \ V characterise the invariants that are expected to hold in the visible states and between visible states of the current method execution, respectively. That is, they reflect the local knowledge of the current method, but do not describe globally all the invariants that need to hold in a given state.
For any state with heap h and execution stack σ, the function vi(σ, h) yields the set of valid invariants, that is, invariants that are expected to hold :
The call stack is empty at the beginning of program execution, at which point we expect the heap to be empty. For each additional stack frame σ, the corresponding method m may assume X σ at the beginning of the call, and may break V σ during the call. Therefore, we add [
A state with heap h and stack σ is valid iff:
(1) σ is a valid stack, denoted by h V σ (Def. 12 in App. A), and meaning that the receivers of consecutive method calls are within the respective C regions.
These properties are formalised in Def. 3. A state is determined by a heap h and a runtime expression e r ; the stack is extracted from e r using function stack, given by Def. 13 in App. A.
Definition 3 A state with heap h and runtime expression e r is valid for a verification technique V , e r |= V h, iff:
Soundness. A verification technique is sound if verified programs only produce valid states and do not throw fatal exceptions. More precisely, a verification technique V is sound for a programming language PL iff for all well-formed and verified programs Π ∈ PL, any well-typed and verified runtime expression e r executed in a valid state reduces to another verified expression e r with a resulting valid state. Note that a verified e r contains no fatalExc (see Fig. 9 ). Well-formedness of program Π is denoted by wf Π (Def. 14, App. A). Welltypedness of runtime expression e r is denoted by h e r : t and required as part of a sound type system in Def. 11, App. A. These requirement permits separation of concerns, whereby we can formally define verification technique soundness in isolation, assuming program well-formedness and a sound type system. Definition 4 A verification technique V is sound for a programming language PL iff for all programs Π ∈ PL:
Instantiations
In our earlier paper [8] , we discuss six verification techniques from the literature in terms of our framework, namely those by Poetzsch-Heffter [31] , Huizing & Kuiper [14] , Leavens & Müller [16] , Müller et al. [27] , and Lu et al. [23] . In this paper we concentrate on the techniques based on heap topologies [27, 23] , because those benefit most from the formalisation in our framework.
Müller et al. [27] present two techniques for multi-object invariants, called ownership technique and visibility technique (OT and VT for short), which use the hierarchic heap topology enforced by Universe types [6] . Their distinctive features are: (1) Expected and vulnerable invariants are specified per class(2) Invariant restrictions take into account subclassing (thereby addressing the subclass challenge). (3) Proof obligations are required before calls (thereby addressing the call-back challenge) and at the end of calls. (4) Program restrictions are uniform for all methods 3 , and are based on the relative object placement in the hierarchy.
Lu et al. [23] define Oval, a verification technique based on ownership types, which support owner parameters for classes [5] , thus permitting a more precise description of the heap topology. The distinctive features of Oval are: (1) Expected and vulnerable invariants are specific to every method in every class through the notion of contracts. (2) Invariant restrictions do not take subclassing into account. (3) Proof obligations are only imposed at the end of calls. (4) To address the call-back challenge, calls are subject to "subcontracting", a requirement that guarantees that the expected and vulnerable invariants of the callee are within those of the caller.
OT, VT, and Oval are discussed in more detail in our companion report [7] . In the remainder of this section, we introduce these techniques and summarise them in Fig. 6 . To sharpen our discussion w.r.t. structured heaps, we will be adding annotations to the example from Fig. 1 , to obtain a topology where the Person p owns the Account a and the DebitCard d. 
Instantiation for OT and VT
Universe types associate reference types with Universe modifiers, which specify ownership relative to the current object. The modifier rep expresses that an object is owned by the current object; peer expresses that an object has the same owner as the current object; any expresses that an object may have any owner. Fig. 7 shows the Universe modifiers for our example from Fig. 1 , which allow one to apply OT and VT. To address the subclass challenge, OT and VT both forbid rep fields f and g declared in different classes c f and c g of the same object o to reference the same object. This subclass separation can be formalised in an ownership model where each object is owned by an object-class pair (see [18] for details).
Regions and Properties. For OT and VT, we define the sets of regions and properties to be:
In our framework, Universe modifiers intuitively correspond to regions, since they describe areas of the heap. For example, peer describes all objects which share the owner (object-class pair) with the current object. However, because of the subclass separation described above, it is useful to employ richer regions of the form rep c , describing all objects owned by the current object and class c. For regions (and properties) we also include the "union" of two regions (properties).
For properties, self c represents the singleton set containing a pair of the current object with the class c. The property super c represents the set of pairs of the current object with all its classes that are superclasses of c. The property peer c represents all the objects (paired with their classes) that share the owner with the current object, provided their class is visible in c. There are also properties to describe the invariants of an object's owned objects, its owner, its transitively owned objects, and its transitive owners. A property of the form p 1 ; p 2 denotes a composition of properties, which behaves similarly to function composition when interpreted. The formal definitions of the interpretations of these regions and properties can be found in App. B.
Ownership Technique. As shown in Fig. 6 , OT requires that in visible states, all objects owned by the owner of this must satisfy their invariants (X).
Invariants are allowed to depend on fields of the object itself (at the current class), as in I1 in Fig. 1 , and all its rep objects, as in I2. Other client invariants such as I4 and I5) and subclass invariants that depend on inherited fields (such as I3) are not permitted. Therefore, a field update potentially affects the invariants of the modified object and of all its (transitive) owners (D).
A method may update fields of this (U). Since an updated field is declared in the enclosing class or a superclass, the invariants potentially affected by the update are those of this (for the enclosing class and its superclasses, which addresses the subclass challenge) as well as the invariants of the (transitive) owners of this (V).
OT handles multi-object invariants by allowing invariants to depend on fields of owned objects (D). Therefore, methods may break the invariants of the transitive owners of this (V). For example, the invariant I2 of Person (Fig. 1) is legal only because account is a rep field (Fig. 7) . Account's method withdraw need not preserve Person's invariant. This is reflected by the definition of E: only the invariants of this are proven at the end of the method, while those of the transitive owners may remain broken; it is the responsibility of the owners to re-establish them, which addresses the multi-object challenge. As an example, the method spend has to re-establish Person's invariant after the call to account.withdraw.
Since the invariants of the owners of this might not hold, OT disallows calls on references other than rep and peer references (C). For instance, the call holder . notify () in method sendReport is not permitted because holder is in an ancestor ownership context.
The proof obligations for method calls (B) must cover those invariants expected by the callee that are vulnerable to the caller. This intersection contains the invariant of the caller, if the caller and the callee are peers because the callee might call back; it is otherwise empty (reps cannot callback their owners).
Visibility Technique. VT relaxes the restrictions of OT in two ways. First, it permits invariants of a class c to depend on fields of peer objects, provided that these invariants are visible in c (D). Thus, VT can handle multi-object structures that are not organised hierarchically. For instance, in addition to the invariants permitted by OT, VT permits invariants I4 and I5 in Fig. 1 . Visibility is transitive, thus, the invariant must also be visible wherever fields of c are updated. Second, VT permits field updates on peers of this (U).
These relaxations make more invariants vulnerable. Therefore, V includes additionally the invariants of the peers of this. This addition is also reflected in the proof obligations before peer calls (B) and before the end of a method (E). For instance, method withdraw must be proven to preserve the invariant of the associated DebitCard, which does not in general succeed in our example. Fig. 8 shows our example in Oval using ownership parameters [5] to describe heap topologies. The ownership parameter o denotes the owner of the current object; p denotes the owner of o and specifies the position of holder in the hierarchy, more precisely than the any modifier in Universe types.
Instantiation for Oval
Method Contracts. Ownership parameters are also used to describe expected and vulnerable invariants, which are specific to each method. Every Oval program extends method signatures with a contract I, E : the expected invariants at visible states (X) are the invariants of the object characterised by I and all objects transitively owned by this object; the vulnerable invariants (V) are the object at E and its transitive owners. These properties are syntactically characterised by Ls in the code (and Ks in typing rules), where:
and where X stands for the class' owner parameters. In class Account (Fig. 8) , withdraw() expects the current object and the objects it transitively owns to be valid (I=this) and, during execution, this method may invalidate the current object and its transitive owners (E=this). The contract of sendReport() does not expect any objects to be valid at visible states (I=bot) but may violate object p and its transitive owners (E=p).
Subcontracting. Call-backs are handled via subcontracting, which is defined using the order L L , which expresses that at runtime the object denoted by L will be transitively owned by the object denoted by L . To interpret Oval's subcontracting in our framework, we use SC(I, E, I , E , K), which holds iff:
where I, E characterise the caller, I , E characterise the callee, and K stands for the callee's owner. The first two requirements ensure that the caller guarantees the invariant expected by the callee. The other two conditions ensure that the invariants vulnerable to the callee are also vulnerable to the caller. For instance, the call holder . notify () in method sendReport satisfies subcontracting because caller and callee do not expect any invariants, and the callee has no vulnerable invariants. In particular, the receiver of a call may be owned by any of the owners of the current receiver, provided that subcontracting is respected (C).
Regions and Properties. To express Oval in our framework, we define regions and properties as follows (see App. B for their interpretations):
As already stated, expected and vulnerable properties depend on the contract of the method and express X as I ; rep * and V as E ; own * (see Fig. 6 ). Similarly to OT, invariant dependencies are restricted to an object and the objects it transitively owns (D). Therefore, I1 and I4 are legal, as well as I3, which depends on an inherited field. Oval imposes a restriction on contracts that the expected and vulnerable invariants of every method intersect at most at this. Consequently, at the end of a method, one has to prove the invariant of the current receiver, if I = E = this, and nothing otherwise (E). In the former case, the method is allowed to update fields of its receiver; no updates are allowed otherwise (U). Therefore, spend and withdraw are the only methods in our example that are allowed to make field updates. Oval does not impose proof obligations on method calls (B is empty), but addresses the call-back challenge through subcontracting. Therefore, call-backs are safe because the callee cannot expect invariants that are temporarily broken. With the existing contracts in Fig. 8 , subcontracting permits spend to call account.withdraw(), and withdraw to call this .sendReport(), and also sendReport to call holder . notify (). The last two subcalls may potentially lead to callbacks, but are safe because the contracts of sendReport and notify do not expect the receiver to be in a valid state (I =bot).
Subclassing and Subcontracting. Oval also requires subcontracting between a superclass method and an overriding subclass method. As we discuss later, this is too weak to guarantee soundness [22] , and we have found a counterexample (cf. Sec. 6). Therefore, we use the following stronger requirement for methods m of a class c and its subclass c , which ensures that a subclass method expects at most the invariants expected by the superclass method, and vice versa for vulnerable invariants:
This requirement guarantees (S5) from Def. 5 in the next section. We refer to the verification technique with this stronger requirement as Oval'.
Summary
Having shown how to instantiate these three techniques in our framework, and applied the instantiations to our example, we summarise here the commonalities and differences that are apparent in the results.
Invariant semantics:
In OT and VT, the invariants expected at the beginning of withdraw are I1, I2, and I3 for the receiver, as well as I5 for the associated DebitCard (which is a peer). For withdraw in Oval, I = this, therefore the expected invariants are I1, I2, and I3 for the receiver.
Invariant restrictions:
Invariants I2 and I5 are illegal in OT and Oval, while they are legal in VT (which allows invariants to depend on the fields of peers). Conversely, I3 is illegal in OT and VT (it mentions a field from a superclass), while it is legal in Oval. 3. Proof obligations: In OT, before the call to this .sendReport() and at the end of the body of withdraw, we have to establish I1 and I2 for the receiver. In addition to these, in VT we have to establish I5 for the debit card. In Oval, the same invariants as for OT have to be proven, but only at the end of the method because call-backs are handled through subcontracting. In addition, I3 is required. 5 In all three techniques, withdraw is permitted to leave the invariant I4 of the owning Person object broken. It has to be re-established by the calling Person method. 4. Program restrictions: OT and VT forbid the call holder . notify () (reps cannot call their owners), while Oval allows it. On the other hand, if method sendReport required an invariant of its receiver (for instance, to ensure that holder is non-null), then Oval would prevent method withdraw from calling it, even though the invariants of the receiver might hold at the time of the call. The proof obligations before calls in OT and VT would make such a call legal.
Well-Structured Verification Techniques
We now identify conditions on the components of a verification technique that are sufficient for soundness, state a general soundness theorem, and discuss soundness of the techniques presented in Sec. 5.
Definition 5 A verification technique is well-structured if, for all programs in the programming language:
In the above, the set theoretic symbols have the obvious interpretation in the domain of properties. For example (S2) is short for ∀h, ι :
We use viewpoint adaptation r p, defined as:
meaning that the interpretation of a viewpoint-adapted property r p w.r.t. an address ι is equal to the union of the interpretations of p w.r.t. each object in the interpretation of r
The first two conditions relate proof obligations with expected invariants. (S1) ensures for a call within the permitted region that the expected invariants of the callee (r X c ,m ) minus the invariants that hold throughout the calling method (X c,m \ V c,m ) are included in the proof obligation for the call (B c,m,r ). (S2) ensures that the invariants that were broken during the execution of a method, but which are required to hold again at the end of the method (V c,m ∩ X c,m ) are included in the proof obligation at the end of the method (E c,m ) .
The third and fourth condition ensure that invariants that are broken by a method m of class c are actually in its vulnerable set. Condition (S3) deals with calls and therefore uses viewpoint adaptation for call regions (C c,m,c ,m . . .) . It restricts the invariants that may be broken by the callee method m , but are not re-established by the callee through E. These invariants must be included in the vulnerable invariants of the caller. Condition (S4) ensures for field updates within the permitted region that the invariants broken by updating a field of class c are included in the vulnerable invariants of the enclosing method, m.
Finally, (S5) establishes conditions for subclasses. An overriding method m in a subclass c may expect fewer invariants than the overridden m in superclass c . Moreover, the subclass method must leave less invariants broken than the superclass method.
Soundness Results. The five conditions from Def. 5 guarantee soundness of a verification technique (Def. 4), provided that the programming language has a sound type system (see Def. 15 in App. A).
Theorem 6 A well-structured verification technique, built on top of a programming language with a sound type system, is sound.
This theorem is one of our main results. It reduces the complex task of proving soundness of a verification technique to checking five fairly simple conditions. Unsoundness of Oval. The original Oval proposal [23] is unsound because it requires subcontracting for method overriding, which gives, in our terminology V c,m \X c,m V c ,m , which is weaker than our (S5). We were alerted by this discrepancy, and using the X and V components (no type system properties, nor any other component), we constructed the following counterexample.
The call c.mm() is checked using the contract of mm from C1; it expects the callee to re-establish the invariant of the receiver (c), and is type correct. However, the body of mm in C2 may break the receiver's invariants, but has no proof obligations (E c2,mm = emp). Thus, the call c.mm() might break the invariants of c, thus breaking the contract of m. The reason for this problem is, that theinitially appealing-parallel between subcontracting and method overriding does not hold. We communicated the example to the authors, who confirmed our findings [22] .
Soundness of the Remaining Techniques. We proved soundness of six verification techniques [7] , including the three presented in Sec. 5. Our proof of Corollary 8 confirmed soundness claims from the literature. We found that the semi-formal arguments supporting the original soundness claims at times missed crucial steps. For instance, the soundness proofs for OT and VT [27] do not mention any condition relating to (S3) of Def. 5; in our formal proof, (S3) was vital to determine what invariants still hold after a method returns. We relegate proofs of the theorems to the companion report [7] .
Related Work
Object invariants trace back to Hoare's implementation invariants [12] and monitor invariants [13] . They were popularised in object-oriented programming by Meyer [24] . Their work, as well as other early work on object invariants [20, 21] did not address the three challenges described in the introduction. Since they were not formalised, it is difficult to understand the exact requirements and soundness arguments (see [27] for a discussion). However, once the requirements are clear, a formalisation within our framework seems straightforward.
The idea of regions and properties is inspired from type and effects systems [33] , which have been extremely widely applied, e.g., to support race-free programs and atomicity [10] .
The verification techniques based on the Boogie methodology [1, 3, 18, 19] do not use a visible state semantics. Instead, each method specifies in its precondition which invariants it requires. Extending our framework to Spec# requires two changes. First, even though Spec# permits methods to specify explicitly which invariants they require, the default is to require the invariants of its arguments and all their peer objects. These defaults can be modelled in our framework by allowing method-specific properties X. Second, Spec# checks invariants at the end of expose blocks instead of the end of method bodies. Expose blocks can easily be added to our formalism.
In separation logic [15, 32] , object invariants are generally not as important as in other verification techniques. Instead, verifiers are encouraged to write predicates to express consistency criteria [28] . Abstract predicate families [29] allow one to do so without violating abstraction and information hiding. Parkinson and Bierman [30] show how to address the subclass challenge with abstract predicates. Their work as well as Chin et al.'s [4] allow programmers to specify which invariants a method expects and preserves, and do not require subclasses to maintain inherited invariants. The general predicates of separation logic provide more flexibility than can be expressed by our framework.
We know of only one technique based on visible states that cannot be expressed in our framework: Middelkoop et al. [26] use proof obligations that refer to the heap of the pre-state of a method execution. To formalise this technique, we have to generalise our proof obligations to take two properties; one for the pre-state heap and one for the post-state heap. Since this generality is not needed for any of the other techniques, we omitted a formal treatment in this paper.
Some verification techniques exclude the pre-and post-states of so-called helper methods from the visible states [16, 17] . Helper methods can easily be expressed in our framework by choosing different parameters for helper and non-helper methods. For instance in JML, X, B, and E are empty for helper methods, because they neither assume nor have to preserve any invariants.
Once established, strong invariants [11] hold throughout program execution. They are especially useful to reason about concurrency and security properties. Our framework can model strong invariants, essentially by preventing them from occurring in V.
Existing techniques for visible state invariants have only limited support for object initialisation. Constructors are prevented from calling methods because the callee method in general requires all invariants to hold, but the invariant of the new object is not yet established. Fähndrich and Xia developed delayed types [9] to control call-backs into objects that are being initialised. Delayed types support strong invariants. Modelling these in our framework is future work.
Conclusions
We presented a framework that describes verification techniques for object invariants in terms of seven parameters and separates verification concerns from those of the underlying type system. Our formalism is parametric w.r.t. the type system of the programming language and the language used to describe and to prove assumptions. We illustrated the generality of our framework by instantiating it to describe three existing verification techniques. We identified sufficient conditions on the framework parameters that guarantee soundness, and we proved a universal soundness theorem. Our unified framework offers the following important advantages:
1. It allows a simpler understanding of the verification concerns. In particular, most of the aspects in which verification techniques differ are distilled in terms of the parameters of our framework. 2. It facilitates comparisons since relationships between parameters can be expressed at an abstract level (e.g., criteria for well-structuredness in Def. 5), and the interpretations of regions and properties as sets allow formal comparisons of techniques in terms of set operations. 3. It expedites the soundness analysis of verification techniques, since checking the soundness conditions of Def. 5 is significantly simpler than developing soundness proofs from scratch. 4. It captures the design space of sound visible states based verification techniques.
We plan to use our framework for the development of further, more flexible, verification techniques.
A Appendix-The Framework where R and P are sets, and Prg is a set where every Π ∈ Prg is a tuple (F1) M (c, m) = t, t ⇒ ∃e. B(c, m) = e, , c, m, t e : t (F2) c <: c , F (c , f ) = t, c ⇒ F (c, f ) = t , c , t = t (F3) c <: c , M (c, m) = t, t , M (c , m) = t , t ⇒ t = t , t = t (F4) c <: c , B(c , m) = e , c ⇒ ∃c . B(c, m) = e, c , c <: c s usual in ownership systems, h ι : c ι describes that ι points to an object of a subclass of c ι , while h ι ι expresses that ι is owned by ι, and h ι * ι is the transitive closure. We interpret properties as follows: 
